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WHO BENEFITS FROM CHILD BENEFIT?
LAURA BLOW, IAN WALKER and YU ZHU
∗
Governments, over much of the developed world, make signiﬁcant ﬁnancial
transfers to parents with dependent children. For example, in the United States the
recently introduced Child Tax Credit (CTC), which goes to almost all children, costs
almost $1 billion each week, or about 0.4% of GNP. The United Kingdom has even
more generous transfers and spends an average of about $30 a week on each of
about 8 million children—about 1% of GNP. The typical rationale given for these
transfers is that they are good for our children and here we investigate the effect of
such transfers on household spending patterns. In the United Kingdom such transfers,
known as Child Beneﬁt (CB), have been simple lump sum universal payments for a
continuous period of more than 20 years. We do indeed ﬁnd that CB is spent differently
from other income—paradoxically, it appears to be spent disproportionately on adult-
assignable goods. In fact, we estimate that as much as half of a marginal dollar of
CB is spent on alcohol. We resolve this puzzle by showing that the effect is conﬁned to
unanticipated variation in CB so we infer that parents are sufﬁciently altruistic toward
their children that they completely insure them against shocks. (JEL I38, D79, D12)
I. INTRODUCTION
Over most of the developed world large
ﬁnancial transfers are made to parents by virtue
of their parenthood. For example, in the United
States the recently introduced Child Tax Credit
(CTC), which goes to the vast majority of
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children,1 costs almost $1 billion each week,
or about 0.4% of GNP. The United Kingdom
government spends on average about $25 (at
present exchange rates) each week on each
child in the form of a lump sum transfer
called Child Beneﬁt (CB) which goes to all
children, and in addition, the United Kingdom
has its own version of CTC which goes to
almost all families with children—and together
CB and CTC account for approximately 1%
of GNP.2 In the United Kingdom, CB and
1. See Burman and Wheaton (2005).




CRRA: Constant Relative Risk Aversion
CTC: Child Tax Credit
DWP: Department of Work and Pensions
FES: Family Expenditure Survey
GDP: Gross Domestic Product
GNP: Gross National Product
JSA: Job Seeker’s Allowance
IS: Income Support
OPB: One Parent Beneﬁt
TANF: Temporary Assistance for Needy Families




Vol. 50, No. 1, January 2012, 153–170
doi:10.1111/j.1465-7295.2010.00348.x
Online Early publication December 15, 2010
© 2010 Western Economic Association International154 ECONOMIC INQUIRY
CTC represent a sizeable contribution to family
net incomes, especially for the single parent
households considered in this paper.
The typical rationale for these payments that
are ostensibly earmarked for children is that
they are good for our children. Such transfers
are usually motivated by concern for the wel-
fare of children and implicitly presume that
there is some market failure that prevents par-
ents from investing in the desired quality and/or
quantity of children throughout their lives. This
might arise, for example, through child qual-
ity being a household public good implying
parental free-riding in quality investments, or
through imperfections in fertility control, or
credit market constraints that prevent house-
holds from smoothing the costs of children.
A further motivation is that this is a form of
intra-household redistribution so that, in house-
holds where resources are not pooled, a trans-
fer payment via the mother may have different
effects on spending than other forms of income.
Moreover, particular concern arises for children
in poor households, and the United States and
the United Kingdom are distinctive in having
child poverty rates that are considerably higher
than that in most other developed countries.3
Thus, there may be credit market constraints that
prevent households, especially poor ones, from
spreading the costs associated with children
across their lifetimes that CB can help mitigate.
This paper is concerned with the impact
on household spending patterns of exogenous
changes in a lump sum cash transfer that is made
to all parents. The United Kingdom is an excel-
lent laboratory to address this issue because CB
has been a simple lump sum universal trans-
fer for a period of more than 20 years from
1980 up to the introduction of CTC, which is
a means-tested supplementary transfer, in 2001.
Since that reform in the late 1970’s, the level of
payments has varied dramatically over time.
Rather than consider intra-household distri-
bution issues, our aim here is to try to com-
plement existing research on the relationship
between child outcomes and household income
by trying to infer how CB is spent—in par-
ticular, we are interested in how CB affects
spending on adult and child speciﬁc goods. That
is, we investigate the impact of CB on house-
hold spending patterns with a view to estimating
its impact on goods that are “assignable” to
3. For international comparisons, see Micklewright
(2004) and UNICEF (2000).
either children or adults. Thus, this paper takes
a direct approach as to whether “money mat-
ters” by investigating the effect of variations in
transfer households with children on household
spending decisions. We provide separate esti-
mates for lone mothers, where intra-household
distributional issues do not arise, from moth-
ers with partners present, where it may. Thus,
for lone mothers our results indicate the pure
effect of the fact that CB is “labeled,” while
for couples any such effect is confounded with
any intra-household distributional effect. We are
particularly concerned with spending on “child
goods” and use spending on children’s cloth-
ing to reﬂect this. In contrast, we also look
at how transfers to parents affect spending on
“adult goods” and use alcohol, tobacco, and
adult clothing as examples of these.4
Our headline ﬁnding is that CB is spent
differently from regular income—but, paradox-
ically, it is spent disproportionately on adult-
assignable goods. This appears to be true for
single parents as well as for couples and so is
not attributable to just intra-household redistri-
bution. On the face of it, this might be inter-
preted as implying that mothers have a callous
disregard for the welfare of their children. We
resolve this paradoxical ﬁnding when we disag-
gregate our variation in CB into anticipated vari-
ation and unanticipated variation in CB, which
we are able to do by virtue of a peculiarity of
the CB system in the United Kingdom. We are
motivated to disaggregate variations in CB in
this way because altruism toward one’s children
would, in a simple model at least, imply that
mothers would insure their children against sur-
prises in income, including CB. Thus, we would
expect anticipated variation in CB to have an
effect on spending on child-assignable goods
that is the same as other anticipated variations
in income. In contrast, unanticipated changes in
CB should be spent on adult-assignable goods
and not at all on child-assignable goods.
These theoretical propositions are broadly
supported by our empirical analysis. Our clean-
est results are for lone parents where there is
no intra-household distribution issue. Here the
unanticipated variation in CB, driven by policy
changes, is spent disproportionately on adult-
assignable goods. In contrast, we ﬁnd that there
is no signiﬁcant overall difference in the way
4. Our analysis is one of a complete demand system
where we impose the adding up condition. Thus there is
an excluded category of expenditure whose coefﬁcients are
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in which this is spent, relative to other income
sources. Thus, it is parents who beneﬁt from
unanticipated variation in CB—a result that is
consistent with the view that mothers are altru-
istic toward their children and so insure them
against income shocks.
Although CB is universal (i.e., not means
tested), it clearly contributes to a reduction in
child poverty as measured in the United King-
dom.5 In any event, it seems plausible that
lessons that we learn here from this universal
program applies to means-tested transfers that
are explicitly aimed at relieving child poverty.6
CB, in 2010, was worth £20 ($30) per week
for the ﬁrst child,7 and £13.20 ($20) for subse-
quent ones, and this has recently been joined by
the CTC which is a further program that pro-
vides a tax credit for children structured in such
a way that its value only falls as income rises
at a level of income that is far above the mean
level of household income.8 This credit was fur-
ther superseded in April 2003 by the CTC worth
£10.40 (around $15) per household per week,
slightly more than the Children’s Tax Credit,
and where the means testing starts higher up the
income distribution. The total of all child-related
cash beneﬁts amounts to 2% of GDP in 2010
5. Child poverty is measured by counting the number
of children in households whose incomes fall below 60% of
the median of the overall household income distribution so
that it is a relative measure. Thus, a reform that increases the
incomes of households with children through CB and leaves
other households unaffected must decrease child poverty
even though it is not a means-tested transfer. The UK ﬁnance
minister, then Gordon Brown, described child poverty as “a
scar on the soul of Britain” in a speech at the 1999 SureStart
Conference. He went on to promise that increases in CB
under the Labour government were part of “immediate and
direct action” to provide “cash help to lift children out of
poverty”.
6. Income Support (IS) and Job Seekers’ Allowance
(JSA), the out-of-work welfare programs (mainly for poor
lone parents, the disabled, and the unemployed), have
also beneﬁted from increasingly generous additions for
dependent children, as has Working Families’ Tax Credit
(WFTC), the main in-work welfare program.
7. Prior to 2007 there was a higher rate of CB paid to
lone parents, called One Parent Beneﬁt (OPB). This was
ﬁxed in nominal terms in 2000 and inﬂation between 2000
and 2007 closed the differential.
8. WFTC and Children’s Tax Credit has recently been
replaced by Working Tax Credit (WTC) and CTC but
they broadly retain their earlier structure (Brewer 2003).
In contrast to the extensive cash support for children
in the United Kingdom and the relative unimportance
of means-testing, the United States, until recently, relied
heavily on in-kind transfers such as food stamps, targeted
nutrition schemes such as the school breakfast program, the
health care cover provided by MedicAid, and Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) which typically
provides extensive childcare support but rather little explicit
cash. Indeed, the cash that is provided is time limited.
in the United Kingdom, about half of which is
accounted for by CB and CTC, compared to
1.5% in the late 1970’s, despite the dramatic
fall in fertility. Indeed, the recent reforms to the
welfare system have been driven by the desire
to ensure that absolute cash support for children
is independent of parental circumstances such as
unemployment, sickness, and disability.9
To anticipate our ﬁndings, we show that
CB is spent differently from other sources of
income—but, paradoxically, we ﬁnd that it
is spent disproportionately on adult-assignable
goods, not on child-assignable goods.10 We
resolve this paradox by making a distinction
between anticipated and unanticipated variation
in CB. The plan of the paper is as follows:
Section II outlines the existing literature on child
outcomes and parental incomes which motivates
our analysis and reviews the few existing papers
that investigate spending patterns; Section III
summarizes our data on CB variation and on
household spending patterns; Section IV pro-
vides our empirical ﬁndings that relates the two;
and Section V draws the conclusion.
II. LITERATURE
Economists take it for granted that giving
additional income to individuals will improve
their welfare. But understanding how important
giving additional income to parents is likely to
be for the well-being of their children is more
complex. This is because children depend on
the behaviors and decisions made by their par-
ents to determine how much, and in what way,
they will beneﬁt from additional income into
the household. Most straightforwardly, parental
income could be important for child outcomes
because parents could use additional income to
buy goods and services that are good for their
children and represent an investment in their
children’s future well-being. Such theories of
parental investment in their children have been
the focus of many economists’ thinking about
the role of parental income in determining chil-
dren’s outcomes (Becker and Tomes 1986).
Recent work on spending on child and adult
clothing by Kooreman (2000) for the Nether-
lands suggests the fact that the money is labeled
as child beneﬁt motivates households to indeed
9. See Adam and Brewer (2004) for a review of the
development of all UK child-related beneﬁts including CB.
10. Remember that our result is for lone mothers so has
nothing to do with intra-household distributional issues as
in Lundberg, Pollak, and Wales (1997).156 ECONOMIC INQUIRY
spend it disproportionately on child goods essen-
tially because of a “mental accounting” effect.11
That paper exploits differential variation in CB
by age of child for one-child households and
ﬁnds that the estimated marginal propensity to
spend on child clothing is higher for CB than
for other income and so argues that this is evi-
dence of a “labeling effect.” However, identiﬁ-
cation relied on a single change in the rate for
young children versus older children that was
almost coincident with the change in the pay-
ment mechanism. Under this reform the recip-
ient, in the overwhelming number of cases,
ceased to be the head of household and became
the mother.12 The only statistically signiﬁcant
ﬁnding was for one-child married couples—for
larger households and for single mothers there
were no signiﬁcant effects of CB.
Moreover, further work on Slovenia by
Edmonds (2002) found no signiﬁcant effects.
However, this work exploited the dependence of
SlovenianCBonhouseholdincomeandthenum-
berofchildrenintheprevious yearandsorequires
that these have no direct effect on current expen-
diture patterns—something that seems unlikely
becauseofserialcorrelationinincomes,habitper-
sistence, and the fact that changes in the number
ofchildreninthehouseholdarelikelytobeantic-
ipated.13 As in the Netherlands, UK CB over the
period 1980 to 2000 was a universal (not means-
tested) program, where payments depended on
thecurrentnumberofdependentchildren,wentto
themother,paymentswerenotsubjecttotaxation,
and participation was effectively 100%.14 Thus,
11. See Thaler (1990) for why this phenomenon might
exist and why it leads to differences in marginal propensities
to consume out of different forms of income.
12. Thus, the paper places some weight on the presump-
tion that this ‘wallet-to-purse” transfer had an equal effect on
spending patterns across households with different aged chil-
dren. Since maternal market labor supply may be affected
by the intra-household transfer this seems unlikely.
13. Jacoby (2002) investigates in-kind (food) transfers
targeted on children and ﬁnds no evidence of a “ﬂypaper”
effect of such transfers increasing the caloriﬁc intake of the
children. Bingley and Walker (1997) consider the effects
of giving food and milk to children on household spend-
ing patterns—we ﬁnd signiﬁcant effects on household milk
spending. Schluter and Wahba (2008) examine the effects on
household spending patterns of the Mexican Progressa exper-
iment whereby schooling subsidies were randomly assigned.
They show signiﬁcant effects of the subsidy on child clothing
expenditure which they interpret as altruistic behavior. How-
ever, the subsidy is conditional on attending schools and it
seems likely that this conditionality affects how the money
is spent—for example, attending school may itself have an
impact on clothing needs.
14. Private correspondence with DWP conﬁrms that this
also applies to the supplement to CB that is paid to lone
parents—OPB.
the United Kingdom offers an interesting lab-
oratory to study the effect of CB because we
do not have to correct for program nonpartici-
pation. Indeed, it was this absence of selectivity
that allowed Lundberg, Pollak, and Wales (1997)
to investigate the impact of the UK “wallet to
the purse” reform in the late 1970’s. The argu-
mentforsuchareformwasthatmothersarebetter
agents for their children than fathers. The authors
show, in grouped data, that there is an increase in
spending on child clothing relative to adult cloth-
ing and female adult clothing relative to male
adult clothing following the reform which gave
mothers control over this source of income.15
These ﬁndings, that household members fail to
pool their resources in making spending deci-
sions, have been echoed in other studies16 and
suggest a rejection of the unitary model of house-
hold behavior. Here, we abstract from these con-
siderationsbyonlyusingdatapost1979,bywhich
time the wallet-to-purse reform had been fully
implemented,17 and using the couples samples
separatelyfromtheloneparentssample.Inthelat-
ter, there is no intra-household issue, whereas in
the former our estimates are conditional on it.18
15. However, analyses of the microdata by Ward-Batts
(2000) and Hotchkiss (2005) cast doubt on the original
conclusions. Limited studies exist elsewhere: for example,
Bradbury (2004) analyzes a similar natural experiment in
Australia and ﬁnds no effect of the redistribution. Here we
abstract from this issue entirely by concentrating on the
spending patterns of single parent households. We intend to
revisit the intra-household distributional issue that Lundberg
et al. investigated because there is signiﬁcant variation in the
level of CB paid to mothers in couples that could be very
informative.
16. SeePhippsandBurton(1998)andBourguignonet al.
(1993), for example. However, these studies simply examine
whether spending patterns are affected by the individual
composition of household income without regard to the
potential endogeneity of that composition.
17. Our data record who receives the CB in the house-
hold: the proportion of two-parent households where the
mother is the recipient is 99.1%.
18. More recently Gregg, Waldfogel, and Washbrook
(2004)havedescribedhowpatternsofspendinghavechanged
between 1996/97 and 2000/01, for low income households
relative to other households as their relative disposable
incomes varied (for a variety of reasons, not just CB). They
ﬁnd that spending on alcohol and tobacco for low income
households with children relative to those with higher income
has fallen, and that spending on toys, games, and clothing and
footwear has risen. However, their analysis takes no account
of changing composition of the low income group relative to
the rest—which will have been dramatic because of the large
change in in-work welfare entitlements that occurred in 1999,
the introduction of the National Minimum Wage in 1999, and
the unfolding New Deals, especially for lone parents, all of
which will have contributed to a reduction in worklessness
among this low income group of parents. Moreover, there
will have been cyclical effects that have more pronounced
effects on the bottom of the distribution than the rest.BLOW, WALKER & ZHU: WHO BENEFITS FROM CHILD BENEFIT? 157
FIGURE 1


























































































































































































































































































































































































































III. DATA AND IDENTIFICATION
Our analysis covers the 21 years from 1980
(when CB had ﬁnally entirely replaced the ear-
lier system of Family Allowances whose main
beneﬁciaries were fathers) to 2000 (after which
tax credits for parents were introduced which
would complicate our analysis because these
credits were means tested and were subject to
a potential take-up problem). Across this period
there have been wide variations in real CB
within years induced by differences in inﬂa-
tion across years, and large changes in the real
value of CB between years driven by reforms
whereby CB was reﬂated by more or less than
the inﬂation rate from the previous uprating.
For example, a large reform occurred in 1991
whereby CB entitlement of the ﬁrst child rose
by a considerable amount, and a further increase
for the ﬁrst child occurred in 1999. Figure 1
shows the two sources of variation in real CB
for ﬁrst and subsequent children and for lone
parents and couples separately.19 The sawtooth
shape in the 1980’s clearly shows the effects of
inﬂation—something that is not obvious in later
years when inﬂation was considerably lower.
19. See Greener and Cracknell (1998) for the historical
background and development of CB in the United Kingdom.
The real reductions over the period 1984 to 1990
shows the effect of not uprating in line with
price inﬂation in the period when the Conser-
vative government of the day had (implicitly)
adopted a policy of targeting support on the
very poorest households through real rises in
the generosity of the in-work welfare program
for parents (then called Family Credit) at the
expense of CB. In 1991, a large real rise in CB
for the ﬁrst child of a couple was introduced—
this distinction between ﬁrst and subsequent
children had always been a feature of CB for
lone parents (lone parents received a supple-
ment to CB known as OPB that created this
wedge between ﬁrst and subsequent children)
but not for couples. In a controversial change in
1997, the new Labor government abolished the
OPB and so effectively eliminated this distinc-
tion between couples and lone parents.20 How-
ever, the adverse effect on (new) lone parents
was soon ameliorated when the rate for all ﬁrst
children was subject to a large real increase.
Until 1999, and the Labour government’s
commitment to abolish child poverty, the real
value of CB was lower than it had been when it
was ﬁrst introduced in 1978 and that remained
20. Lone parents who were already in receipt of OPB
prior to 1997 were allowed to retain it.158 ECONOMIC INQUIRY
the case for the ﬁrst children of lone parents
and for all subsequent children in 2001, and still
remains to the present. The real value of CB
for the ﬁrst child of lone parents had fallen by
more than 10%, whereas the value for all subse-
quent children had fallen by more than 15%.
It is only with the recent introduction of the
supplement to CB known as Child Tax Credit
(CTC) that the real values of child-contingent
ﬁnancial support enjoyed by parents back in
1979 have been matched. Our analysis relies
on the real variation in CB for given household
types. That is, we make no attempt to exploit
the variation in CB across household types at a
point in time. We do this because we do not
want to rely on functional form assumptions
that restrict how different numbers of children
affect household spending. Moreover, we do not
want to make any assumptions about the nature
of intra-household distribution of income so
we present estimates separately for lone parent
households and couples (which include repart-
nered divorcees). Finally, we also decompose
our data into those on in-work welfare (WFTC)
and out-of-work welfare (IS) and those not.
CB interacts with the latter because CB counts
as income for the purposes of computing IS
payments and nominal CB rises are effectively
taxed at 100%—although the situation is com-
plicated by the fact that the child-related com-
ponent of IS is also increased over time. We
choose not to attempt to exploit this source of
variation on the grounds that it may be too subtle
for consumers to detect and the group affected
is, in any case, quite small. Thus, most of
our analysis will be conducted over households
who are not on either in-work or out-of-work
welfare.
Effectively, identiﬁcation comes from two
sources: the variation in inﬂation rates across
years that ensures that we can identify antici-
pated effects independently of seasonality (effec-
tively we assume that the seasonality in the data
is orthogonal to inﬂation); and from the various
reforms that ensure that there are discontinu-
ities in anticipated CB (that cannot account for
smooth changes in expenditure patterns).
We use Family Expenditure Survey (FES)
data on household spending patterns, which con-
tain detailed household21 expenditure informa-
tion, constructed from two consecutive weekly
21. Spending data at the individual level is not available
in the public use ﬁles. However, since 1995 the data has
separately recorded the expenditure of all children aged
7–15.
diary records supplemented with information
about regular payments. The expenditure data is
regarded as being quite accurate with the excep-
tion of alcohol and tobacco,22 which are under-
recorded relative to other sources of information.
Moreover, there is considerable consistency over
time. The data also records sources of income
and their levels and periodicity, and the detailed
characteristics of respondent households includ-
ing the number and ages of children.23 Table 1
shows the breakdown of the data by household
type. Table 2 shows some summary statistics for
households with exactly one child.
IV. ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS
In our parametric work, we test for dif-
ferential marginal propensities to consume out
of CB compared to other income for differ-
ent commodity groups. Unlike earlier research,
we model the whole of household (nonhousing)
spending—both child-assignable goods as well
as those that are adult-assignable and those that
are not assignable at all (food, and all other non-
housing expenditure24). Identiﬁcation relies on
the sizeable real variation in CB over time—at
least part of which is discontinuous arising from
reforms. Because we exploit only time series
CB variation, we present estimates in the body
of the paper based on samples of households
that contain only one child. We assume that
expenditure on good i by household h is given
by eih = fi(xh,CBh) + Zhβi + εih where xh is
household h’s other income25 (deﬁned as total
22. See Tanner (1998) for an analysis of the reliability
of FES expenditure data. The deﬁciency in the alcohol
and tobacco categories is thought to be largely associated
with differential response rates of smokers and drinkers and
not because of under-recording by respondents. We ﬁnd no
evidence that under-recording is correlated with the real
variation in CB.
23. We drop all households where the youngest child
is 16 and over because the FES treats the clothing of
children aged 16 and over as adult clothing. We also exclude
multiple beneﬁt unit households so that our sample consists
of “nuclear” families only.
24. This latter is the excluded category. Homogeneity
of demands would allow us to recover the parameters
of this excluded category form the parameters estimated
assuming that adding-up holds. The estimates are guaranteed
to be independent of which commodity forms the excluded
category.
25. We use total expenditure (minus CB) as our
explanatory variable rather than income. This is to ensure
consistency with an intertemporally separable lifecycle max-
imizing model (Blundell and Walker, 1986). Results using
total (net of tax and welfare) income (minus CB) are essen-















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































expenditure minus CB), Zh is vector of exoge-
nous characteristics such as age and age squared
of the household head, dummy variables to con-
trol for having a child aged 0–4 and 5–10 (rel-
ative to 11–15), region to control for regional
differences in spending, and a linear trend26
and a vector of month dummies to capture
seasonal variations in spending, and εih cap-
tures the unobservable determinants of spending
patterns.27
Because each of the expenditure equations
contains the same explanatory variables we
estimate the system using the usual Seemingly
Unrelated Regression method to allow us to test
cross equation restrictions. We impose adding
up in the usual manner of omitting one arbitrary
equation. We omit all other expenditure apart
from the assignable ones (male, female, and
child clothing, alcohol, and tobacco) and food
so just six equations are reported.
In our parametric analysis discussed later, we
further assume that fi(xh,CBh) is linear and
additively separable. Linearity here is unlikely to
be important—we are estimating a local approx-
imation around the mean of total expenditure
and the effect of CB is, itself, small varia-
tion around that mean. The speciﬁcation fol-
lows earlier research by Kooreman (2000) and
Edmonds (2002) who estimate simple speci-
ﬁcations where expenditure on each good is
assumed to be a linear function of CB and
of total expenditure less CB. To ensure that
our results are as robust as possible we select
relatively homogenous samples to minimize
the importance of Z. Our objective is to test
whether fi(xh,CBh) is such that child ben-
eﬁt has the same effects on expenditures as
total expenditure CB does—we refer below to
this latter effect as the Engel curve slope.28
We estimate separate systems for couples and
26. We included a cubic spline in month of survey to
capture smooth changes in tastes but were able to reject this
in favor of a simple linear trend.
27. Estimates which include relative prices are available
on request. We do not control for relative prices here because
when we tested for the time series correlation between CB
and monthly relative prices we found an insigniﬁcant partial
correlation of only 0.088. Including relative prices does not
affect our estimates in any way apart from slightly increasing
their precision.
28. We experimented with nonlinear Engel curves. For
example, we found that when we entered CB and other
expenditure quadratically the marginal effects, evaluated at
the means, were essentially unchanged. In any event we do
go on to provide estimates for subsets of the data broken
down by income and ﬁnd that our main results carry over




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Estimated Effects of £1 of CB and £1 of Other Income on Spending on Each Good: Parents with







Clothing Food Alcohol Tobacco
Couples, N = 8,575
CB 0.014 0.213 0.196 −0.188 0.491 −0.005
(0.2)( 1.9)( 1.8)( 1.3)( 4.3)( 0.1)
Other Expenditure 0.017 0.039 0.028 0.075 0.033 −0.000
(22.8)( 34.7)( 24.9)( 51.8)( 28.9)( 0.6)
χ2
(CB=Other exp) 0.00 2.44 2.30 3.32 16.47 0.01
p. 97 .12 .13 .07 .00 .94
Overall χ2(6) = 26.87 p = .0002
Lone Parents, N = 744
CB 0.154 0.706 0.074 −0.096 0.212 0.009
(0.9)( 2.9)( 0.8)( 0.5)( 2.1)( 0.1)
Other Expenditure 0.025 0.064 0.007 0.067 0.019 0.001
(6.6)( 12.4)( 3.1)( 16.0)( 8.6)( 0.4)
χ2
(CB=Other exp) 0.54 7.11 0.47 0.68 3.51 0.01
p. 46 .01 .49 .41 .06 .92
Overall χ2(6) = 11.81 p = .0664
Notes: Figures in parentheses are absolute t-values. Other explanatory variables are: a linear trend; month, region, and
dummy variables for whether the child was aged 0–4, 5–10 (relative to 11–15); a quadratic in age of household head; and
a lone father dummy in the lone parent sample. The F statistic in each equation is a test of whether the coefﬁcient on CB
and on other income is equal, and the overall F statistic is a test that all of the CB coefﬁcients equal the corresponding other
income coefﬁcients. Bold values indicate statistical signiﬁcance at 5% level.
lone parents.29 We are particularly interested in
this distinction for two reasons. Firstly, the sin-
gle parents sample is immune from the problem
that there may be an intra-household pooling
issue which might cause CB, which is given
to mothers, to have different effects from other
sources of income because, in the case of lone
mothers, all sources of income are at the disposal
of the mother. Secondly, if underinvestment in
child quality arises from each parent free-riding
on the other, then this would be reﬂected in
the behavior of couples and not in that of lone
mothers.
A. Benchmark Results
The benchmark results are shown in Table 3,
which provides estimates using the couples and
29. We refrain from using childless households in the
analysis because they are uninformative about the question
at hand. They clearly cannot be used to estimate the effect
of CB. Moreover, while they can be used to estimate the
Engel curve slope for adult goods, they cannot be used to
estimate the Engel curve slopes for child-assignable goods
since there is no such expenditure in childless households.
Although they can be used to estimate the Engel curve slopes
for adult-assignable goods, such estimates would not be
comparable with the estimates for household with children
since “adding up” (i.e., homogeneity of degree zero) is
imposed across a smaller set of goods.
lone parents data for those with one child
aged under 16,30 who are not on welfare.31
The assignable goods equations and the food
equation are presented (the residual spending
equation is not presented and the estimates
are independent of the excluded equation). The
coefﬁcients show the effect of £1 of CB and of
other income on spending on each good. The
key result here is that it is alcohol spending
that changes when CB changes with a marginal
propensity of 0.49 for couples (0.21 for sin-
gle parents)—much larger than the marginal
propensity to spend on alcohol from other
income. For lone mothers we ﬁnd that there
is a signiﬁcant effect (0.71) on adult women’s
clothing. In the case of couples the CB effect on
alcohol (and for lone parents the effect of CB
on mother’s clothing) is more than ten times
larger than the Engel curve slope. The χ2 and
p-statistics test for the restriction that marginal
propensity to spend out of CB income is the
30. Results restricted to children under 11 are almost
identical.
31. We investigated the sensitivity to including welfare
recipients in the samples. For welfare recipients CB counts
as income when computing other welfare payments to
households. Thus, we do not expect any effect of CB in
such households and this is, indeed, what we do ﬁnd.BLOW, WALKER & ZHU: WHO BENEFITS FROM CHILD BENEFIT? 163
TABLE 4







Clothing Food Alcohol Tobacco
Couples, N = 8,560
CB −0.011 0.152 0.158 −0.309 0.434 0.000
(0.1) (1.3) (1.4)( 2.0) (3.7) (0.0)
Other Expenditure 0.006 0.014 0.008 0.035 0.015 −0.003
(10.6) (15.9) (8.5)( 29.0) (16.3) (6.2)
χ2
(CB=Other exp) 0.05 1.38 1.72 4.74 12.99 0.00
p. 83 .24 .19 .03 .00 .96
Overall χ2(6) = 25.72 p = .0003
Lone Parents, N = 738
CB 0.169 0.712 0.076 −0.062 0.244 0.013
(0.9) (2.7) (0.8)( 0.3) (2.3) (0.2)
Other Expenditure 0.006 0.023 0.002 0.028 0.008 −0.001
(2.1) (5.6) (1.5)( 7.9) (4.8) (0.7)
χ2
(CB=Other exp) 0.81 6.95 0.54 0.16 4.94 0.03
p. 37 .01 .46 .69 .03 .86
Overall χ2(6) = 12.52 p = .0513
Notes: Figures in parentheses are absolute t-values. Other explanatory variables are: a linear trend; month, region, and
dummy variables for whether the child was aged 0–4, 5–10 (relative to 11–15); a quadratic in age of household head; and
a lone father dummy in the lone parent sample. Households with negative other incomes are excluded. Bold values indicate
statistical signiﬁcance at 5% level.
same as that out of other income (deﬁned as
total expenditure minus CB). The restriction that
the marginal propensities to spend out of CB and
other income are the same is rejected for alcohol
in the couples sample, and for women’s clothing
in the lone parent sample. The overall χ2 and
p values test the restrictions, across all goods,
that the effects of CB and other expenditure are
the same. We strongly reject this restriction for
couples although the value for lone parents is
not quite signiﬁcant.32
B. Robustness of Benchmark Results
Infrequency of purchase is clearly an issue
in short-survey datasets. This gives rise to a
measurement error problem that would lead
to biased estimates. Keen (1986) shows that
32. Clearly part of the variation in real CB arises
because of differential inﬂation rates across years. There is
a possibility that the differential effect on spending patterns
is due to business cycle effects that are correlated with
inﬂation and not adequately controlled in the model by
the inclusion of total expenditure. If the variation in the
expenditures of households with children was being affected
by the business cycle rather than by real CB variation then
we would expect the same to be true of households without
children. We investigated this by looking at the correlation
matrix between expenditures and inﬂation for both singles
and couples without children. We found no correlation. Thus,
we feel that our results are not contaminated by omitted
business cycle effects.
this can be resolved by instrumenting total
expenditure, and here we use total household
income as an instrument. Moreover, alcohol is
well known to be under-reported in survey data.
Because alcohol is a component of total expen-
diture then this would normally give rise to the
other income coefﬁcient being biased toward
zero. Under-reporting of spending on any good
induces nonclassical measurement error in total
expenditure and, because of adding up it seems
likely that bias will affect all equations. There
do not appear to be any analytical results of the
effects of this sort of measurement issue in the
literature and there are no strong a priori grounds
for thinking the bias should be systematically in
one direction.33
The results are reported in Table 4. In com-
parison with Table 3 there are some changes in
magnitude but there is no change in the pat-
tern or signiﬁcance of results. In Table 5, we
33. This instrument is commonly used in demand sys-
tem estimation (Blundell, Pashardes, and Weber, 1993). The
absence of any analytical results of the effects of this sort
of measurement issue in the literature prompted us to simu-
late some data with varying degrees of under-recording and
our consequent estimates (not shown here but available from
the authors upon request) suggest that the basic ﬁndings still
hold, even with substantial degrees of under-reporting (e.g.,
with up to half of households under-reporting true alcohol
expenditure by 50% on average).164 ECONOMIC INQUIRY
TABLE 5







Clothing Food Alcohol Tobacco
Couples, N = 8,575
CB 0.014 0.275 0.174 −0.188 0.522 0.020
(0.1)( 1.6)( 0.7)( 1.3) (4.0) (0.1)
Other Expenditure 0.024 0.053 0.057 0.075 0.038 −0.004
(21.2)( 32.1)( 22.4)( 51.8) (29.1) (2.5)
F(CB=Other exp) 0.01 1.70 0.19 3.31 13.89 0.03
p. 93 .19 .66 .07 .00 .86
Lone Parents, N = 744
CB 0.152 0.673 0.678 −0.094 0.421 0.141
(0.5)( 1.8)( 1.0)( 0.5) (2.8) (0.7)
Other Expenditure 0.039 0.085 0.031 0.067 0.025 0.000
(6.4)( 10.9)( 2.3)( 16.0) (8.1) (0.0)
F(CB=Other exp) 0.15 2.37 0.93 0.67 6.98 0.45
p. 70 .12 .33 .41 .01 .50
Notes: Figures in parentheses are absolute t-values. Other explanatory variables are: a linear trend; month, region, and
dummy variables for whether the child was aged 0–4, 5–10 (relative to 11–15); a quadratic in age of household head; and
a lone father dummy in the lone parent sample. Bold values indicate statistical signiﬁcance at 5% level.
re-estimate using Tobit to allow for the zeroes
in the expenditures. There is no change, rela-
tive to Table 3, for couples but for lone par-
ents the result for women’s clothing becomes
insigniﬁcant while alcohol becomes larger and
signiﬁcant. Thus, it seems unlikely that our
results are driven by measurement error. If any-
thing, our instrumental variable and Tobit results
strengthen our conclusion from Table 3.
The identiﬁcation of the CB coefﬁcients in
Table 3 derives entirely from the time series
variation. Although the real value of CB does
not exhibit a time trend (and, in any event
our modeling includes both a linear trend and
a set of month controls), we ﬁrst test for the
robustness of the results in Table 3 by re-
estimating over the 1980’s data (1980–1989)
separately from the 1990’s (1990–2000) data.
These results are presented in Table 6 for the
1980’s and the 1990’s separately. The results
in Table 3 for the pooled data over the whole
period are conﬁrmed—with alcohol being the
source of rejection for couples—men’s cloth-
ing in the latter period, and women’s clothing
being the problem for lone mothers but only
in the 1990’s. In Table 7, we re-estimate for
subsamples of mothers with different levels of
education: left school at 16 (the minimum), at
17/18, or 19+. Our conclusion remains: couples
reject through alcohol, whereas lone mothers
reject through mother’s clothing.
Table 8a and 8b divides the samples into the
top, middle, and bottom thirds of the respective
income (total expenditure) distributions because
one might be concerned that Engel curves are
nonlinear. Again the headline results are broadly
conﬁrmed: all but the bottom third of couples
signiﬁcantly reject because of alcohol; while the
top third of the lone mothers reject because of
women’s clothing. Even for the bottom third the
alcohol and women’s clothing coefﬁcients on
CB are much larger than the respective other
income coefﬁcients, albeit not signiﬁcant.
Table 9 replicates Table 3 but uses only the
data for children under 11. We do this in case
the benchmark results are contaminated by the
possibility that parents may be wearing child
clothing.34 The strong results for couples remain
although the precision of the lone mothers sam-
ple falls sufﬁciently that the effects become
insigniﬁcant. Nevertheless, the sizes of the coef-
ﬁcients for lone mothers are comparable with
Table 3.
C. Anticipated and Unanticipated Variation
Despite the weight of evidence here that
suggests that variations in CB are reﬂected in
adult-assignable, and not in spending on child-
assignable, goods it would be inappropriate to
conclude that the lack of equivalence between
CB and other income implies that parents put
34. Although there is a sales tax distinction between
adult and child clothing that is deﬁned by sizes, the FES
clothing data is self-reported as child or adult.BLOW, WALKER & ZHU: WHO BENEFITS FROM CHILD BENEFIT? 165
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Clothing Food Alcohol Tobacco
Couples, N = 4,554 (1980–1989)
CB 0.019 −0.127 −0.311 −0.682 0.607 −0.003
(0.1)( 0.6)( 1.6) (2.7) (2.6) (0.0)
Other Expenditure 0.017 0.045 0.033 0.076 0.045 0.002
(16.0)( 26.1)( 20.1)( 35.6)( 23.0)( 1.8)
χ2
(CB=Other exp) 0.00 0.67 2.96 8.67 5.72 0.00
p. 99 .41 .09 .00 .02 .97
Overall χ2(6) = 19.95 p = .0028
Lone Parents, N = 325 (1980–1989)
CB 0.223 0.305 0.198 0.080 0.094 −0.014
(0.8)( 0.8)( 1.0)( 0.3)( 0.7)( 0.1)
Other Expenditure 0.030 0.058 0.014 0.069 0.015 0.003
(4.2)( 6.2)( 2.9)( 9.8)( 4.1)( 0.9)
χ2
(CB=Other exp) 0.49 0.46 0.95 0.00 0.33 0.02
p. 48 .50 .33 .97 .57 .89
Overall χ2(6) = 2.28 p = .89
Couples, N = 4,021 (1990–2000)
CB −0.045 0.265 0.456 0.241 0.509 −0.054
(0.4)( 1.8) (3.0) (1.2) (3.9) (0.6)
Other Expenditure 0.017 0.036 0.024 0.075 0.025 −0.002
(16.0)( 23.6)( 15.5)( 36.6)( 19.0)( 1.9)
χ2
(CB=Other exp) 0.34 2.41 7.92 0.68 13.43 0.33
p. 56 .12 .00 .41 .00 .56
Overall χ2(6) = 23.25 p = .0007
Lone Parents, N = 419 (1990–2000)
CB 0.166 1.043 −0.038 −0.333 0.337 0.045
(0.7) (3.2) (0.4)( 1.2)( 2.2)( 0.4)
Other Expenditure 0.022 0.066 0.003 0.066 0.020 −0.001
(5.1)( 10.8)( 1.9)( 12.4)( 7.3)( 0.3)
χ2
(CB=Other exp) 0.39 8.78 0.19 1.91 4.37 0.15
p. 53 .00 .67 .17 .04 .69
Overall F, p χ2(6) = 16.52 p = .0112
Notes: Figures in parentheses are absolute t-values. Other explanatory variables are: a linear trend; month, region, and
dummy variables for whether the child was aged 0–4, 5–10 (relative to 11–15); a quadratic in age of household head; and
a lone father dummy in the lone parent sample. Bold values indicate statistical signiﬁcance at 5% level.
less weight on the welfare of their children than
on their own so that, at the margin, they favor
expenditure on adult goods. Rather, an alterna-
tive explanation would be that parents may place
so much weight on the welfare of their children
that they fully insure them against income vari-
ations so that, at least unanticipated, variation in
incomes does not affect spending on the children.
Suppose the simplest case where all goods
are exclusive to either adults or children and
the utility function of the altruistic parent is
deﬁned as Va(y − x)+ δVc(x + b) where δ > 0
indicates altruism, y is the household income
(assumed to be the adult’s (a)), x is the trans-
fer from parent to child (c), b is a transfer from
the government to the child. Differentiating with
respect to x shows that the equilibrium transfer
to the child is such that λa =− δλc (for an inte-
rior optimum where some positive transfer takes
place), where the λ’s are the respective marginal
utilities of income. The optimal transfer, x∗,i s
such that it would be the same if the welfare
transfer, b, had been made to the parent rather
than the child.35 In the case where b is uncer-
tain it is useful to consider a simple benchmark
case of Va and Vc being CRRA functions of
y − x and x + b, respectively. In this case, the
35. See Bergstrom (1989) for discussion of Becker’s
rotten kid theorem.166 ECONOMIC INQUIRY
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Clothing Food Alcohol Tobacco
Mother Left School at 16; Couples, N = 5,271
CB 0.017 0.459 0.590 −0.086 0.378 0.018
(0.2)( 3.4)( 4.6)( 0.5)( 2.8)( 0.2)
Other Expenditure 0.020 0.040 0.029 0.078 0.037 0.002
(18.2)( 27.8)( 21.1)( 39.6)( 26.1)( 1.9)
χ2
(CB=Other exp) 0.00 9.65 18.75 0.78 6.43 0.02
p. 98 .00 .00 .38 .01 .88
Overall χ2(6) = 32.15 p = .0000
Mother Left School at 17/18; Couples, N = 1,980
CB −0.146 −0.017 −0.129 −0.246 0.579 −0.013
(1.2)( 0.1)( 0.7)( 1.0)( 3.5)( 0.1)
Other Expenditure 0.016 0.043 0.026 0.074 0.030 0.003
(10.4)( 16.8)( 11.7)( 23.9)( 14.6)( 2.0)
χ2
(CB=Other exp) 1.74 0.09 0.79 1.72 11.27 0.02
p. 19 .77 .37 .19 .00 .88
Overall χ2(6) = 17.24 p = .0084
Mother Left School at 19+; Couples, N = 1,324
CB 0.543 −0.042 −0.377 −0.710 0.892 −0.014
(2.0)( 0.1)( 0.7)( 1.3)( 1.6)( 0.1)
Other Expenditure 0.016 0.035 0.029 0.068 0.031 0.001
(8.9)( 12.2)( 8.5)( 19.0)( 8.7)( 1.0)
χ2
(CB=Other exp) 3.66 0.03 0.57 1.92 2.40 0.01
p. 06 .86 .45 .17 .12 .91
Overall χ2(6) = 9.92 p = .1279
Mother Left School at 16; Lone Parents, N = 366
CB 0.109 0.618 −0.092 −0.081 0.135 0.019
(0.6)( 2.4)( 1.2)( 0.3)( 1.2)( 0.2)
Other Expenditure 0.054 0.095 0.012 0.086 0.022 −0.000
(8.9)( 11.5)( 5.2)( 11.2)( 6.0)( 0.0)
χ2
(CB=Other exp) 0.08 4.03 1.99 0.47 0.93 0.02
p. 78 .04 .16 .49 .33 .88
Overall χ2(6) = 8.33 p = .2151
Mother Left School at 17/18; Lone Parents, N = 154
CB 0.318 1.185 0.073 −0.252 0.367 0.182
(0.5)( 2.1)( 0.4)( 0.6)( 1.5)( 1.1)
Other Expenditure 0.033 0.031 0.002 0.077 0.009 0.003
(3.3)( 3.3)( 0.6)( 10.7)( 2.2)( 1.2)
χ2
(CB=Otherexp) 0.22 4.29 0.17 0.59 2.19 1.23
p. 65 .04 .68 .44 .14 .27
Overall χ2(6) = 8.03 p = .2357
Mother Left School at 19+; Lone Parents, N = 224
CB 0.051 1.111 0.497 −0.224 0.171 −0.011
(0.2)( 2.0)( 1.9)( 0.5)( 0.7)( 0.1)
Other Expenditure 0.009 0.061 0.007 0.052 0.023 0.002
(1.7)( 6.3)( 1.5)( 7.0)( 5.6)( 0.8)
χ2
(CB=Otherexp) 0.02 3.67 3.59 0.44 0.41 0.01
p. 89 .06 .06 .51 .52 .93
Overall χ2(6) = 8.82 p = .1841
Notes: Figures in parentheses are absolute t-values. Other explanatory variables are: a linear trend; month, region, and
dummies for whether the child was aged 0–4, 5–10; and a quadratic in age of household head. Bold values indicate statistical
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TABLE 8
Engel Curves and Household Income
(a) Couples with One Child Not on Welfare, 1980–2000
Child Clothing Women’s Clothing Men’s Clothing Food Alcohol Tobacco
Couples in Bottom Third of Income Distribution N = 2,859, Mean Income = £215.81/wk
CB 0.060 0.275 0.072 −0.571 0.315 0.068
(0.4)( 1.3)( 0.4)( 1.8)( 1.4)( 0.4)
Other Expenditure 0.019 0.043 0.028 0.085 0.040 0.005
(12.9)( 20.0)( 13.8)( 27.0)( 17.8)( 2.8)
χ2
(CB=Other exp) 0.08 1.18 0.05 4.43 1.54 0.12
p. 78 .28 .83 .04 .21 .73
Overall χ2(6) = 7.95 p = .2415
Couples in Middle Third of Income Distribution N = 2,858, Mean Income = £349.59/wk
CB 0.094 −0.017 −0.132 −0.016 0.348 0.035
(0.8)( 0.1)( 0.8)( 0.1)( 2.3)( 0.3)
Other Expenditure 0.018 0.036 0.030 0.067 0.023 0.004
(11.4)( 17.1)( 15.0)( 22.9)( 11.3)( 2.7)
χ2
(CB=Other exp) 0.42 0.11 1.09 0.14 4.60 0.06
p. 52 .74 .30 .71 .03 .80
Overall χ2(6) = 7.13 p = .3085
Couples in Top Third of Income Distribution N = 2,858, Mean Income = £621.44/wk
CB −0.086 0.343 0.508 −0.184 0.701 −0.036
(0.6)( 1.6)( 2.4)( 0.7)( 3.3)( 0.4)
Other Expenditure 0.016 0.038 0.027 0.065 0.031 0.001
(11.5)( 18.1)( 12.6)( 26.0)( 14.2)( 0.8)
χ2
(CB=Other exp) 0.57 2.13 5.14 1.01 9.87 0.16
p. 45 .14 .02 .31 .00 .69
Overall χ2(6) = 19.99 p = .0028
(b) Lone Parents with One Child Not on Welfare, 1980–2000
Child Clothing Women’s Clothing Men’s Clothing Food Alcohol Tobacco
Lone Parents in Bottom Third of Income Distribution N = 248, Mean = £123.28/wk
CB −0.269 0.462 0.058 −0.101 0.166 0.089
(1.0)( 1.8)( 0.5)( 0.4)( 1.5)( 0.7)
Other Expenditure 0.060 0.074 0.026 0.107 0.015 0.001
(5.1)( 6.5)( 4.7)( 9.9)( 3.0)( 0.1)
χ2
(CB=Other exp) 1.49 2.17 0.06 0.72 1.86 0.46
p. 22 .14 .80 .40 .17 .50
Overall χ2(6) = 7.80 p = .2531
Lone Parents in Middle Third of Income Distribution N = 248, Mean = £224.79/wk
CB 0.138 0.091 −0.081 0.101 0.225 −0.040
(0.5)( 0.3)( 0.8)( 0.3)( 1.3)( 0.3)
Other Expenditure 0.057 0.047 0.001 0.072 0.020 0.003
(6.7)( 4.3)( 0.4)( 7.2)( 3.6)( 0.5)
χ2
(CB=Other exp) 0.09 0.02 0.69 0.01 1.34 0.07
p. 77 .90 .41 .93 .25 .79
Overall χ2(6) = 2.89 p = 0.8221
Lone Parents in Top Third of Income Distribution N = 248, Mean = £416.85/wk
CB 0.595 1.560 0.401 −0.607 0.196 −0.017
(1.7)( 2.6)( 1.7)( 1.4)( 0.9)( 0.1)
Other Expenditure 0.012 0.065 0.003 0.052 0.015 0.002
(2.2)( 7.1)( 0.7)( 7.6)( 4.2)( 0.0)
χ2
(CB=Other exp) 2.83 6.41 2.74 2.22 0.63 0.02
p. 09 .01 .10 .14 .43 .90
Overall χ2(6) = 14.35 p = .0260
Notes: Figures in parentheses are absolute t-values. Other explanatory variables are: a linear trend; month, region, and
dummy variables for whether the child was aged 0–4, 5–10 (relative to 11–15); and a quadratic in age of household head.
Bold values indicate statistical signiﬁcance at 5% level.168 ECONOMIC INQUIRY
TABLE 9
Engel Curves and Household Income: Child Aged Up to 10 Only
Explanatory Variables Child Clothing Women’s Clothing Men’s Clothing Food Alcohol Tobacco
Couples, N = 6,564
CB −0.101 0.268 0.267 0.001 0.486 0.021
(1.4)( 2.2)( 2.1)( 0.0)( 3.8)( 0.3)
Other Expenditure 0.016 0.039 0.031 0.077 0.033 −0.000
(21.3)( 29.8)( 22.9)( 45.2)( 23.8)( 0.5)
χ2
(CB=Other exp) 2.71 3.52 3.54 0.23 12.79 0.09
p. 10 .06 .06 .63 .00 .77
Overall χ2(6) = 22.92 p = .0008
Lone Parents, N = 404
CB −0.093 0.592 0.135 0.150 0.134 0.095
(0.5)( 1.8)( 0.8)( 0.6)( 1.0)( 0.9)
Other Expenditure 0.037 0.072 0.014 0.076 0.020 0.004
(8.4)( 9.8)( 3.7)( 12.6)( 6.3)( 1.6)
χ2
(CB=Other exp) 0.46 2.60 0.52 0.08 0.69 0.74
p. 50 .11 .47 .78 .41 .39
Overall χ2(6) = 5.01 p = .5420
Notes: Figures in parentheses are absolute t-values. Other explanatory variables are: a linear trend; month, region, and
dummy variables for whether the child was aged 0–4, 5–10 (relative to 11–15); a quadratic in age of household head; and
a lone father dummy in the lone parent sample. The F statistic in each equation is a test of whether the coefﬁcient on CB
and on other income is equal, and the overall F statistic is a test that all of the CB coefﬁcients equal the corresponding other
income coefﬁcients. Bold values indicate statistical signiﬁcance at 5% level.
optimality property allows us to solve for x in
terms of b. As before, the optimal x∗ depends on
the value of b, but the size of the effect of b on
x now depends on the ratio of the degrees of rel-
ative risk aversions and the extent of altruism.
Only if the parents are sufﬁciently risk averse
with respect to the child’s consumption, relative
to their own consumption, and altruism is suf-
ﬁciently large, will x vary inversely with b.I n
general, parents will not fully insure their chil-
dren unless they themselves are risk neutral.
There is some qualitative evidence that sug-
gests that parents (especially mothers) are likely
to “go without” to protect spending on their
children in the face of adverse shocks.36 To
investigate this issue we assume that house-
holds form static expectations of real CB. That
is, we assume that households expect the gov-
ernment to reinstate the real level of CB to
the value at the previous uprating date 1 year
ago by an appropriate increase in the nominal
CB. We assume that, between uprating dates,
36. Two recent examples of such work are Middleton,
Ashworth, and Braithwaite (1997) and Farrell and O’Connor
(2003). However, the datasets used in these studies are small
and formal hypothesis tests are not conducted. Indeed, such
qualitative research makes no attempt to distinguish between
anticipated and unanticipated variation in income in any
very formal way. Thus, the work here complements that
qualitative research.
households form rational expectations about the
price level and so anticipated real CB falls
according to the actual inﬂation rate. That is,
we assume that households assume that CB will
be indexed in line with inﬂation because the
last increase—and so have static expectations
of policymakers. Thus, we decompose real child




ym is the level of child beneﬁt that
would be anticipated in year y some m months
after the uprating, CBy−12 is the nominal value
of CB at the last uprating and Py−m/Py−12 is
the inﬂation adjustment over the last m months
since the uprating. This captures the varia-
tion in CB arising from the inﬂation that has
occurred since the last uprating. The difference
between actual CB and anticipated CB captures
the change in CB that has occurred because of
the nominal uprating that last occurred—which
we assume is unpredictable and call unantici-
pated CB, CBu
ym.W ea l l o wf o rt h e r et ob ea
differential effect of these two components by
writing our Engel curves as
eih = αiCBa + γiCBu + ηiMh + Zhβi + εih
where M is other expenditure which we assume
is driven by long-run differences between house-
holds arising from skills differences. The resultsBLOW, WALKER & ZHU: WHO BENEFITS FROM CHILD BENEFIT? 169
TABLE 10
Anticipated Versus Unanticipated CB Effects: Rational Expectations
Child Clothing Women’s Clothing Men’s Clothing Food Alcohol Tobacco
Couples, N = 8,575
Anticipated CB −0.233 0.403 0.141 −1.368 0.330 0.174
(1.3)( 1.5)( 0.5)( 3.9)( 1.2)( 1.1)
Unanticipated CB 0.066 0.173 0.208 0.059 0.524 −0.043
(0.8)( 1.4)( 1.7)( 0.4) (4.2) (0.6)
Other Expenditure 0.017 0.039 0.028 0.075 0.033 −0.000
(22.8)( 34.8)( 24.9)( 51.7)( 28.8)( 0.6)
χ2
(antCB=Other exp) 1.83 1.78 0.17 16.66 1.16 1.11
p. 18 .18 .68 .00 .28 .29
Overall χ2(6) = 23.84 p = .0006
χ2
(unantCB=Other exp) 0.34 1.19 2.16 0.01 15.57 0.32
p. 56 .27 .14 .92 .00 .57
Overall χ2(6) = 20.06 p = .0027
Lone Parents, N = 744
Anticipated CB 0.085 0.775 −0.079 −0.326 0.323 0.143
(0.1)( 0.7)( 0.2)( 0.4)( 0.7)( 0.4)
Unanticipated CB 0.156 0.704 0.079 −0.089 0.208 0.005
(0.9) (2.9) (0.8)( 0.4) (2.0) (0.1)
Other Expenditure 0.025 0.064 0.007 0.067 0.019 0.001
(2.4)( 12.4)( 3.1)( 16.0)( 8.6)( 0.4)
χ2
(antCB=Other exp) 0.01 0.47 0.04 0.21 0.46 0.16
p. 94 .49 .84 .65 .50 .69
Overall χ2(6) = 1.28 p = .97
χ2
(unantCB=Other exp) 0.55 6.93 0.53 0.61 3.31 0.00
p. 46 .01 .46 .44 .07 .96
Overall χ2(6) = 11.44 p = .0758
Notes: Other expenditure is deﬁned as total expenditure minus CB. Figures in parentheses are absolute t-values. The lone
parent’s equations include a dummy variable for lone father. Bold values indicate statistical signiﬁcance at 5% level.
are reported in Table 10 in the case where we
assume that expectations of inﬂation are formed
rationally.
The anticipated CB effects are generally
badly determined and therefore are not signif-
icantly different from the coefﬁcients on other
expenditure. This is reassuring: nominal CB
shocks associated with the annual changes only
have a temporary impact on spending on adult
goods. Thereafter, the CB becomes part of per-
manent income and is spent like other permanent
components of income. However, the unantici-
pated CB effects are consistent with our earlier
results and with the interpretation that parents do
insure their children against shocks so that unan-
ticipated CB is spent disproportionately on adult
goods. For couples, spending on alcohol out of
unanticipated CB is signiﬁcantly different from
spending out of other income. For lone parents
the same is true for both alcohol and women’s
clothing. The F- and p-statistics show that in the
couples’ sample the restriction that the marginal
propensity to consume out of unanticipated CB
is the same as that out of other income jointly
for all equations is strongly rejected. However,
the same restrictions cannot be rejected in the
lone parent sample because of a smaller sample
size and a lack of precision.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Our analysis ﬁnds that unanticipated varia-
tion in CB that is driven by policy induced
changes in its real value is disproportionately
spent on adult-assignable goods. The results for
couples suggest that, at the margin, as much as
a half of unanticipated changes in CB is spent
on alcohol. The results for lone parents are less
strong but nonetheless still apparent. These ﬁnd-
ings contrast with those of Kooreman (2000),
which exploits variation in Dutch CB, and of
Edmonds (2002), based on data from Slovenia.
However, this earlier work made no distinction
between anticipated and unanticipated variation
in CB.170 ECONOMIC INQUIRY
A weakness of this line of research is that it
is unclear what inferences can be drawn from
an equivalence (or lack of it) between CB and
other income. One might be tempted to conclude
that CB is treated differently because there is
something different about it. For example, CB
is usually given to the mother so that a lack
of equivalence may suggest imperfect pooling
of household incomes. However, our results are
also true for lone parents where there is no
intra-household distributional issue, so this can-
not account for all of this lack of equivalence.
It is true that the effect for lone parents is less
pronounced, the alcohol coefﬁcient for CB is
around half the size as in the couples samples,
and this is consistent with the idea that there is
some free-riding between partners which does
not occur in single parent households. A sec-
ond issue might be that real CB variation tracks
the business cycle implying that our results are
attributable to cyclical effects in spending. How-
ever, we ﬁnd no such cyclical effects in the
spending patterns of households without chil-
dren and there is little reason to expect house-
holds with children to differ in this respect.
Finally, a simple but important innovation in
this work has been to distinguish between antic-
ipated and unanticipated variation in CB. We
ﬁnd that it is unanticipated CB variation that
is reﬂected in adult-assignable good expenditure
suggesting that parents are successful in provid-
ing at least some insurance for their children.
This ﬁnding suggests a high degree of altruism
on the part of parents. The implication is that
CB may simply ﬁnance spending on children
that would have otherwise occurred.
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